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Casino executives were polled regarding their discounting practices and policies.
The results indicated that casinos offering discounts to players were most concerned
with a player's actual loss and least concerned about the number of hands/rounds played
and the player's average bet. The extant literature clearly demonstrates that such a focus
can result in substantial financial consequences (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2003; Kilby,
Fox & Lucas, 2004). Additionally, the analysis of two discount-oriented deals offered to
premium players demonstrates the potentially destructive power of discounts on casino
cash flows. These results fill a gap in the literature related to the prevalence of discounts
and the extent of casino managements' knowledge of discount mechanics.
Key Words: discounts on loss, rebates on loss, casino marketing incentives, table
games management, casino management, price promotion

Introduction
The general purpose of this research was to learn more about the practice of
discounting gambling losses incurred by premium table game players (a.k.a. highrollers). Specifically, this exploratory study sought to gain an understanding of how well
industry practitioners understand the mathematically complex process of discounting.
For example, which factors do they consider when structuring a discount offer? Are
these the factors that are crucial to successful deal making? What are the consequences
of not understanding this process? To these ends, it was necessary to poll casino
executives as to their discounting policies and practices. Additionally, analyses of actual
discount deals that were offered to premium players provided an alternative means to the
same ends.
Previous researchers have found fault with alleged discounting policies and
practices (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos (2002), but no existing study has
endeavored to survey casino executives, regarding these procedures. That is, discount
policy has been critiqued, based solely on the admission of the general practice and the
experiences of the researchers. No detailed information has been collected from casino
executives regarding actual policies and procedures. However, discounting the losses of
high-rollers is a topic that many casino executives are not willing to freely discuss.
Hence, this study offers rare insight into the high-end deal making processes of the
casino industry.
Discounting player losses is a practice that no executive would want to advertise, as
it clearly reduces cash flows. However, increased competition for premium players has
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increased the frequency and attractiveness of discount deals, for several reasons. First,
the gaming industry has experienced considerable expansion over the last 20 years, both
domestically and internationally. In turn, competition for players has increased with the
addition of these new properties. Second, mega-markets such as Las Vegas have matured
and no longer enjoy the favorable supply-demand relationship of past years (Roehl,
1996). Lastly, there are those that believe the premium player market to be inherently
profitable, a position based on historical conditions that featured a maximum cost
exposure of room, food and beverage (RFB) expense (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002).
Subscribers to this theory will go to great lengths to acquire players they believe to be of
substantial value.
The mainstream marketing literature cites increased sales volume as one of the most
common results of price-based promotions (Blattberg, Briesch & Fox, 1995). However,
the production of casino revenues differs from traditional business forms due to the
random effects of probability on short-term gaming activity. This abstract phenomenon
often leads gaming executives to believe they have
increased the casino's wealth by the amount of a specific
Incentives based on actual player
player's loss. Of course this is rarely true, as players almost
always win or lose more than the casino's theoretical win
losses should not be casually
(t-win). T-win is the product of a player's total wagers
managed. Only those executives
multiplied by the house's statistical advantage on those
with a deep understanding of the
wagers. The true value of a player is determined by t-win,
not his or her actual losses. Hence, incentives based on
complex and abstract matters of
actual player losses should not be casually managed. Only
probability are qualified to define
those executives with a deep understanding of the complex
the terms of these incentives.
and abstract matters of probability are qualified to define
the terms of these incentives.
Due to mounting competitive pressures, many casino executives have found
themselves attempting to out-bid each other by offering ever-increasing discount offers
to premium players. Again, without a keen understanding of the mathematical
underpinnings, discounting can lead to negative cash flows (Lucas, Kilby & Santos,
2002; Kilby & Fox, 1998). Deal-making mistakes carry substantial financial
consequences that can extend well into the future. If unchecked, the effect of these
negative or marginal cash flow deals can be obscured or partially offset/masked by the
success of other profit centers such as slots or hotel operations.

Literature Review
This review contains four sections. First, two studies on the basics of the
discounting process are reviewed. Second, research related to the overall effectiveness
of casino promotions and casino marketing is discussed. Third, literature related to the
specific practice of discounting is reviewed. And finally, the research objectives are
summarized.

Discount Basics
This section is a summary of Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002) and Kilby, Fox and
Lucas (2004). Simply put, these studies showed that a discount reduces the casino's
statistical advantage. In nearly all cases, the house advantage is decreased by an amount
greater than the face value of the discount. Alternatively stated, a 10% discount nearly
always reduces the house advantage by more than 10%. Hence, the casino will refund
more than 10% of its theoretical win. In general, as the number of hands played
increases, the gap between a player's actual outcome and the casino's theoretical win
decreases. When offering a discount, one must be clear regarding the relationship
between the magnitude of the discount and the requirements of the wagering process.
That is, the greater the number of hands played, the greater the discount.
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Also, the player's bet spread must be monitored. Bet spread is the difference,
expressed in units, between the least and greatest wager. Although the bet spread affects
the cost of the discount, players sometimes vary their wagers beyond the agreed-upon
terms of the deal. Bet tracking allows management to "police" the deal. That is, cancel
or revise the discount terms, once the original bet spread
parameter
is breached. Casino executives must be willing to void
The greater the number of hands
or revise the original deal, as the player's betting behavior can
played, the greater the discount. substantially alter the magnitude of his or her discount. For
example, 50% of Player A's wagers are $999, with the remaining
wagers equal to $1, but Player B always wagers $500. Despite the differences in
wagering patterns, both Player A and Player B produce an average bet of $500, but the
cost of a fixed-term discount to Player A will be greater. The erratic betting pattern
(player A's 9:1 bet spread) increases the cost of the discount by increasing the variance
in the outcome distribution. That is, the likelihood of extreme outcomes is increased.
When those extreme outcomes are player losses, the house reduces/discounts them by a
fixed percentage. But when the extreme outcomes result in player wins, no money is
refunded to the casino.
Casino executives must bet track to accurately refund a prescribed percentage of a
player's actual loss. Bet tracking is recording the amount and placement of each wager
made by the player receiving the discount. For example, player X made a $10,000 bet on
the banker, in baccarat. Without bet tracking, neither actual loss nor the true house
advantage can be determined. When executives offer discounts without bet tracking,
they do not know the player's actual winlloss or the house advantage on the wagers
placed. It is easy to see how negative cash flow deals could occur under these
conditions.
Desperation for premium players and a lack of understanding are competing
theories for the reluctance of casino executives to include constraints in discount offers.
The more latitude the player is afforded regarding the number of decisions (e.g., rounds
played), bet placement and bet spread, the more variance he or she can create in the
outcome distribution. A lack of discount deal constraints transfers cost control to the
player. When discounts are involved, high-limit action cannot always be expected to
lead to profits.

I

Casino Promotions
Much of what is written about the effect of casino promotions/marketing on gaming
business volumes is anecdotal. Many of these articles appear to be sales pitches, written
by those responsible for the featured promotion. Unfortunately, the majority of
published empirical research is characterized by findings suggesting that casino
promotions, generally, are failing to produce positive cash flows.
The attempts to increase casino cash flows, via slot promotion, for example, have
only intermittently succeeded. One study of the ever-popular drawing-based promotion
produced evidence suggesting the generation of negative cash flows (Lucas & Bowen,
2002). In most cases, the cash prizes significantly increased coin-in levels, but failed to
produce incremental revenues beyond the cost of the incentives. Other researchers have
produced similar results when attempting to measure the effects of cash mail programs
on slot volume (Lucas & Brewer, 2001; Lucas, Dunn & Singh, 2004).
Cash mail programs are attempts to employ direct marketing practices featuring
buy-in incentives. For example, a customer receiving such an offer would receive
$25.00 in coin or credits for a $20.00 buy-in, producing a $5.00 premium to the player.
However, Lucas and Brewer (2001) produced results suggesting a cash mail program
had produced negative cash flows, despite the significant increases in daily coin-in
associated with the program variable. Lucas, Dunn and Singh (2004) produced similar
results in their analysis of direct mail incentives offered by a Las Vegas Strip casino.
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 8, Issue 2
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To the contrary, a Midwestern riverboat was found to produce positive cash flows
from cash mail offers to slot players (Lucas & Santos, 2003), while Lucas & Brewer
(2001) found slot tournaments to produce positive cash flows for a Las Vegas casino. It
may not be the type of promotion that is crucial for success, but rather the execution,
timeliness and appropriateness of the promotion for the property and market.
With regard to table games promotions, Lucas and Kilby (2002) advanced a
theoretical model to estimate the effectiveness of match-play coupons on table game
business volume. This model was empirically tested by Lucas (in press) only to find
more evidence of negative cash flows. The match-play variable failed to produce a
significant and positive effect on the cash drop levels of a Las Vegas casino. No other
studies were found that measured the effect of casino promotions on actual casino
business volumes. But these findings clearly establish the possibility of less than
profitable promotional activities within the casino industry.

Discounting
Objective research specifically related to the practice of discounting is less
abundant. Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002), discuss discounting practices and failures,
making recommendations to improve existing policies. Binkley's 2001 Wall Street
Journal article also reports on the ill effects of discounting practices on casino cash
flows. But neither of these two pieces focuses on the intricacies of actual discounting
policies. Both articles elude to the widespread use of these play incentives, but offer
little, in terms of recoverable evidence to support the claim. Until this study, no
researcher has attempted to profile discounting policy by polling casino executives, who
are understandably hesitant to discuss these practices. It is not in their financial interest
to advertise discounts and their credibility has been attacked in the existing literature on
this topic (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002).
There seems to be no argument that play incentives and extravagant amenities are
necessary to attract premium table game players (Roehl, 1996; Eadington & KentLemon, 1992). Binkley (2001) also includes commentary from Las Vegas casino
executives in support of this premise. With regard to incentives, the practice of buying
the business is spreading to lower price points (less than high rollers) as well.
Shoemaker & Zemke (2004) have found the promotions and benefits offering of Las
Vegas locals' market casinos to influence the patronage intentions of area residents. But
the high-rollers are especially coveted and casino marketers from competing properties
continually attempt to woo players away from each other, via ever-increasing play
incentives. Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002) theorize that the spiraling cost of play
incentives is due to the belief that the premium play market is inherently profitable.
They hold that if casino executives understood the true cost of these incentives, many of
these offers would not be made.

Research Objectives
Discount policies have been critiqued by previous researchers based solely on their
personal experiences (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002; Binkley, 2001). This study seeks to
obtain self-reported evidence from casino executives, stating that they offer discounts.
As noted by Kilby, Fox and Lucas (2004) and Lucas, Kilby & Santos (2002), discount
rates must change as a function of the number of hands the recipient is willing to play.
Also, the casino must bet track when offering a discount. The second objective of this
study is to gain an understanding of existing discount policies with regard to these
issues. Are managers structuring discounts based on these factors or are they simply
looking at credit lines and actual losses?
Regarding discounts, researchers have also charged casino executives with
irresponsible deal making (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002). Along the

14

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 8, Issue 2

Assessing Discount Policies and Practices in the Casino Industry

same lines, research findings have indicated evidence of negative cash flows associated
with several casino promotions (Lucas, in press; Lucas & Brewer, 2001; Lucas &
Bowen, 2002). Given the apparent disregard for deal and program analysis, this study
seeks to analyze actual discount deals. These analyses will produce estimates of
incremental net cash flows resulting from the deals, providing further insight into the
deal-making prowess of casino marketers. Overall, the analyses of the deals combined
with the self-reported policy details will help determine the degree to which casino
marketers understand the complex effects of discount-related deals.

Methodology
Data Collection
One hundred casino properties were selected for inclusion in this study. Casino City
Press provides a searchable database of casinos called the Gaming Business Directory
(GBD) (Gaming Business Directory, 2002). The database was searched for casinos in
the United States with fifty or more table games. The initial search resulted in ninety-six
properties, from which contact information was also obtained. Four additional properties
with thirty-five or more table games were also determined to be suitable for the study.
Given the number of table games (i.e., 35+), it seemed likely that discounts would be
offered by these properties. With regard to the sampling frame, the number of tables
operated by the casino had no relevance, other than serving as a proxy for the likelihood
of catering to premium play.
The GBD online directory provided information on company executives, including
their area(s) of responsibility. Once the properties were selected, the GBD database was
queried for executives whose responsibilities included senior-level marketing. In most
cases, only one name was listed. When there was more than one individual listed, the
person with the most senior title was selected as the addressee. The intention was for the
survey to be completed by a person likely to design, offer, or be directly involved in the
process of offering discounts to players.
In general, the questionnaire was designed to gauge the knowledge of casino deal
makers with regard to the discounting process. However, the questions also addressed
the gap in the literature related to the prevalence and general understanding of the
discounting practice. Appendix A contains a copy of the questionnaire used in this study.
Ultimately, casinos in the GBD with 35+ table games were sent surveys, via the
U.S. postal service. In an effort to contact non-responders, a follow-up survey was
mailed with a postage-paid return envelope. This follow-up mailing occurred 40 days
after the initial mailing. Cover letters were included in both mailings. The follow-up
cover letter reminded recipients that they had not yet responded.

Individual Deal Terms
Additionally, two discount deals offered to separate parties were analyzed using the
Casino Marketing Manager version 3.3.2. This software is specifically designed to
compute the change in the house advantage of a casino game, resulting from the terms
of discounting deals. The terms of these deals were obtained via the consulting practices
of the authors. Both deals were offered to premium players by Las Vegas casino
executives.
Using survey data is one way to assess the broad-based understanding of the
discounting process, but analysis of actual deals offers another avenue of discovery.
Taken together, it is hoped that these two approaches will provide a clearer picture of the
deal making practices of casino executives. The terms of the two deals are listed in
Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1
Play Summary and Deal Terms: Deall
Player Rating Data:
Days of Play
Marker Play
Chip Play
Total Buy-in
Actual Win/(Loss)
Average Bet
Length of Play (hrs:mins)
T-win
Games Played Most Often (1)
Deal Terms/Expenses:
Non-negotiable Chips
Total Comps (RFB)
Discount: 20% of Actual Loss (2)
Additional Discount (3)
Travel Discount (4)

3
$2,000,000
$1,310,000
$3,310,000
($2,007 ,300)
$46,315.79
18:24
$239,429
Blackjack
$75,000
$85,000
$401,460
$115,000
$25,000

Notes.
(1) If other games were played, the true cost of the discount changes.
(2) This was a 20% a priori discount, i.e., it was agreed upon before any play occurred.
(3) This was a post hoc deal, where the debt to the casino was reduced by an additional
lump sum.
(4) Akin to an airfare incentive

Table2
Summary of Deal Terms: Deal 2
Offer Parameters:
Maximum Bet ( 1)
Average Bet (1)
Commission to Agent (2)
Credit Line
Airfare Allowance (3)
Promo Chips
Game: Baccarat
Discount Schedule: (4)
$0- $1M loss= 15%
$1M- $3M loss= 20%
$3M+ loss= 25%

$100,000
$60,000
$150,000
$5,000,000
$150,000
$150,000

Notes.
(1) Although the player is permitted to wager $lOOk, his average bet over the course of
play must be no more than $60k.
(2) A commission paid to the player's agent, if at least 12 shoes are played or the player
loses at least $3M.
(3) Although a cash airfare allowance was part of the offer, the deal also included
round-trip transportation on the casino's private jet. In reality, the airfare allowance
is simply a cash payment to the player for patronizing the casino.
(4) This tiered discount structure is very popular with casinos.
(5) The player was also offered full RFB status.
(6) After 12 shoes are completed, the deal resets. That is, all play incentives are paid
again, as if it were a new trip.
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Deal 1 (Table 1) includes both deal terms and actual results from gambling activity.
The first section of Table 1 provides the details related to revenue production, including
the game played and the duration of play. These data all originated from actual player
rating cards which were entered into the casino system. The most important line item in
this section is the theoretical win (t-win). Also included in Table 1 are the expenses
associated with Deal 1. According to the terms of the deal, the player was to receive a
20% a priori discount, which amounted to $401,460. However, due to the magnitude of
the player's actual loss, an additional post hoc discount of $115,000 was awarded.
Deal 2 (Table 2) only includes the offer terms/constraints. However, these terms
reset after 12 shoes of baccarat are dealt (about 960 hands). That is, all play incentives
are paid again, as if it were a new gambling visit or trip: This includes a reset for the
discount terms as well. As indicated in Table 2, the player could wager as much as
$100,000 per round, but the average bet over a 12-shoe period could not exceed
$60,000. Deal 2 featured a tiered discount structure wherein the rebate percentage varied
based on the player's actual loss. The discount rate ranged from 15% to 25%.
Once the incremental win (revenue) from these deals was computed, the associated
expenses were considered. These expenses ranged from agent commissions to travel
reimbursement. A complete listing of the associated expenses for each deal can be found
in the Results section. Given the revenue focus of casino marketers, this incremental
cash flow analysis is necessary to demonstrate the bottom-line effect of reducing the
house advantage within an expense-heavy deal structure. The results of the deal analyses
will demonstrate the ultimate effects of actual discount-driven play incentives.

Results
Table 3 lists responses to the survey items related to discount determination factors.
For the purposes of anonymity, the results are listed by each property's identification
code. Thirty surveys were returned, but only 14 casinos reported the use of discounts.
The data in Table 3 pertains to these 14 casino properties.

Table3
Response Summary for Casinos Reporting the Use of Discounts

Casino
ID
K27
K19
K32
J7
K41
E2
K38
K42
K33
K17
K7
J8
K23
B1

Credit
Line
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Min.
Credit
Line(l)
$150,000
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$0
$0
$0
$150,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$0
$0
$0

Discount Determination Factors
#of
Avg.
Hands
Bet (2)
Played (3)
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Min. Actual
Loss (4)
$150,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$100,000
$0
$100,000
$150,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$100,000
$100,000

Notes.
(1) Minimum credit line for a player to be eligible for a discount.
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 8, Issue 2
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(2) Only one property reported a minimum average bet constraint of $800, as a matter
of policy.
(3) No property reported the use of a minimum hands requirement associated with
process of awarding a discount.
(4) This amount represents a minimum loss by the player to become eligible for a
discount.
Only two of 14 respondents were concerned with average bets. And only four of 14
respondents considered the number of hands played. Table 3 clearly indicates that the
player's actual loss was the most important factor related to the discount process.
Although not shown in Table 3, seven of 14 reporting properties claimed to record the
amount and nature of each bet placed by players receiving discounts. Three of the seven
respondents that reported the use of bet tracking noted that this practice was intermittent.
In summary, average bet and number of hands played were not crucial to the process,
while the player's actual loss appeared to be paramount. Additionally, bet tracking
seemed to be of moderate importance.
Table 4 contains results from the same 14 properties described in Table 3. Here the
respondents were asked to weight the importance of four discount determinants. Table 4
summarizes their responses.
Table4
Response Summary: Importance Ranking of Discount Determinants

Casino ID
K27
K19
K32
J7
K41
E2
K38
K42
K33
K17
K7
J8
K23
B1

Credit
Line
0
0
20
0
0
25
0
0
0
0
50
0
0
0

Importance Weight (in %)
Average
#of Hands
Played
Bet Played
0
0
0
0
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25
0
10
0
0
0
0
0

Actual
Loss
100
100
60
100
100
75
100
100
0
100
25
90
100
100

These results corroborate those found in Table 3. All but one property (K7) listed
actual loss as the primary discount criterion. K7 gave credit line the heaviest weight
(50%), well above average bet (0%) and number of hands played (25% ). Without
exception, these latter variables received weights that indicated low importance. The
mode weight for both average bet and number of hands played was zero (12 out of 14
cases). It should be noted that one property (K33) failed to report any weights.
Table 5 analyzes Deal1, which is described in Table 1. Certain assumptions were
made regarding the player's skill level, as the true house advantage was not known.
Blackjack is a game of skill, making the house advantage a function of the game rules
and the player's blackjack ability.
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TableS
Analysis of Deall
Assumptions:
House Advantage Before Discount (1)
Bet Spread (2)
Hands per Hour (3)
Results:
T-win Before Discount (4)
T-win After Discount (5)
Less:
Additional Discount (6)
RFB Expense (7)
Gaming Tax (8)
Non-negotiable Chip Cost (9)
Profit (10)

0.42%
1:4
210
$755,916
$364,425
$115,000
$85,246
$24,599
$79.393
$60,187

Notes
(1) Computed by Casino Marketing Manager software (v. 3.3.2). Assumes a 6-deck
shoe, dealer stands on soft 17, and player can double after split.
(2) The software computes all possible outcomes of wagering activity assuming a 1:4
bet spread. This assumes 50% of the bets are 1-unit wagers and 50% are 4-units
wagers. A constant wager is likely to underestimate the outcome distribution
variance.
(3) 210 hands per hour is the estimated game speed for one-on-one play (Kilby, Fox &
Lucas, 2004). The casino system errantly estimated the hands per hour at 67,
assuming a full table.
(4) (Avg. bet)(House adv.)(Hands per hour)(Hours played). Slight differences may arise
from rounding decisions.
(5) The expected win, after the effect of the 20% discount. The standard deviation of
the associated outcome distribution exceeds $2M. This is no small concern, if
outcome volatility is a concern (i.e., cash flow volatility is an issue).
(6) As this amount is not expressed in a priori terms, it is treated like a cash award.
(7) RFB expense may be reduced by amounts equal to the difference between actual
cost and retail/complimentary room rates. Other cost reductions may be available
for food and beverage charges occurring in casino-operated outlets.
(8) 6,75% of t-win after the discount, i.e., (0.675)(364,425). Nevada's Gaming Control
Board treats discounts as a business expense, making the reduced t-win the
appropriate tax basis. In Las Vegas other local taxes would be owed as well (i.e.,
0.5%).
(9) See Kilby & Fox ( 1998) for more on computing the cost of non-negotiable chips.
This analysis assumes a house edge of 0.42% and a 6.75% gaming tax paid on t-win
generated from chip wash.
(10)T-win after the 20% discount (i.e., $364,425) less associated expenses.
In this case, the player's value to the casino is nowhere near the $2M actual loss or
the $755k t-win, before the discount and expenses. Although the expected value of the
after-discount t-win was $364,425, the standard deviation ofthat outcome distribution
exceeded $2M. This is a tremendous amount of cash flow risk for a $60,187 profit. Most
casinos are not in a position to entertain intermittent play of this magnitude, as the cash
flow variance is capable of destroying quarterly earnings.
In analyzing deal1, it was interesting to discover that the casino system assumed
the player to be wagering on a nearly full table. The following formula was the basis of
this conclusion.
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 8, Issue 2

19

(System t-win) I (House adv.) I (Avg. bet) I (Hours played)= Hands per hour, or
$239,429 I 0.0042 I 46,315.79 I 18.5 hours= 67 hands per hour
A player with an average bet of this magnitude is almost always playing one-on-one
(or head-to-head). That is, only the player and the dealer are on the game. Because of
this condition, the hands per hour estimate increases from 65 to 210 (See Kilby, Fox &
Lucas, 2004 ). This underestimation of premium player t-win is very common. In fact, if
the system theoretical of $239,429 were used in our analysis ofDeal1, a substantial
negative cash flow would result. Based on the information available to management, the
deal should not have been offered to the player.
Table 6 analyzes Deal 2, as described in Table 2. Again it was necessary to make
some assumptions regarding betting strategy. However this analysis was less sensitive to
such assumptions, as this player's game was baccarat. In baccarat the player-side and
banker-side bets have nearly the same house advantage, at 1.24% and 1.06%,
respectively. Tie bets are rarely made by player's of this caliber. Despite the wagering
strategy, the bet tracking process would record all actual wagers, allowing for a precise
house advantage to be determined. But this deal must be analyzed before it is offered to
the player, creating the need for house advantage assumptions.

Table6
Analysis of Deal 2: Mter 12 Shoes of Baccarat
Revenues:
T-win with no discount (1)
T-win after discount (2)
Less Expenses:
Commission to Agent (3)
Airfare Allowance (4)
Promo Chip Allowance (5)
Air/Travel Expense (6)
RFB (7)
Deal Profit:
Profit/(Loss) after 12 shoes (8)

$594,121
351,900
$150,000
150,000
155,691
10,000
15,000
($128,791)

Notes
(1) Assumes 78 hands per shoe, a house edge of 1.06%, 12 shoes played, and an
average bet of $60,000. By truncating the house advantage to two places, rounding
differences from system estimates occurred.
(2) T-win after adjusting for the tiered discount terms (See Table 2).
(3) This commission is part of the deal terms. It is to be paid to the player's agent.
(4) Ostensibly for airfare reimbursement, this incentive has evolved into another cash
bonus.
(5) See Kilby & Fox (1998) for more on computing the cost of non-negotiable chips.
Assumes a house edge of 0.42% and a 6. 75% gaming tax paid on t-win generated
from chip wash. In Las Vegas an additional 0.5% tax on gaming win would be paid.
(6) This expense was estimated based the industry experience of the authors. It
represents the per-trip cost of operating a company aircraft. This estimate is
conservative.
(7) This expense represents the cost of full RFB privileges for the player, his agent, and
any entourage, over a 3-day period. This is a conservative estimate.
(8) T-win after discount less all deal costs.
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This deal is expected to produce negative cash flow. Management should not have
extended these terms. It was a business decision based on either a poor or insufficient
analysis. The Casino Marketing Manager software, or something like it, is necessary to
accurately estimate the after-discount t-win of an offer such as this one. The software
computes all possible outcomes, creating a weighted average discount. That is, it is quite
capable of analyzing the tiered discount structure of this offer.
Again, Deal 2 should have never been offered to the player, under any
circumstances. The player's agent was an effective negotiator. Worse yet, Deal2 offers
reset terms, allowing the player to invoke the terms multiple times. As analyzed, this
offer also produced an outcome distribution with a standard deviation of $2M, making it
an inherently dangerous proposition for most casinos.

Disscussion
Others have cited irresponsible deal making practices, with regard to discounts
offered to players (Binkley, 2001; Lucas Kilby & Santos, 2002). The results of this study
support these claims. Despite the fact that only 14 casinos offered discounts, all of them
are paying attention to the wrong variables, clearly demonstrating a lack of knowledge
in a crucial area.
Further, the authors have analyzed deals for some of the
As discounts change the house casinos that denied the use of discounts. In the experience of
advantage of any game one must the authors, nearly all casinos that cater to a premium play
•
•
'
clientele offer discounts. But, as previously mentioned, this is
pay stnct attention to the dollar- not a topic that casino executives are willing to discuss. In
amount of the wagers placed. summary, the authors believe that the number of casinos
offering discounts was severely under-reported.
As discounts change the house advantage of any game, one must pay strict attention
to the dollar-amount of the wagers placed and the number of wagers placed (Lucas,
Kilby & Santos, 2002; Kilby, Fox & Lucas, 2004). With seven of 14 properties claiming
to bet track, 50% ofthe casinos don't know the house advantage associated with the
deal/game. Of course this assumes the house still has an advantage, which is a
dangerous assumption. Worse yet, three of the casinos claiming to bet track, do so only
intermittently. Bet tracking is labor intensive and may seem unnecessary to these
executives, as the results indicate that they are chiefly concerned with actual losses.
Discounts decrease the house advantage whether players win or lose (Lucas, Kilby
& Santos, 2002). The house advantage is needed to compute a player's theoretical win,
which, in turn, serves as the basis for complimentary awards such as the player's room,
food and beverage (RFB) expenses. However, when RFB awards are computed using
the original game advantage instead of the reduced advantage, the effect of this discount
is increased. After these and other play incentives are considered, there is very little, if
anything left for the casino. The effects of discounts are not obvious, but casino
executives must strive to understand this process, as it affects the players placing the
greatest wagers. For more on the mathematics of discounts, see Kilby, Fox and Lucas
(2004).

Deals 1 and 2
With regard to Deall, a 20% a priori discount reduced the house advantage by
52%, while Deal2's tiered discount can be expected to reduce the house edge by 41%.
The change in the house edge is equal to the change in the t-win, from the beforediscount level. In general, profits are cut in half, before the effects of all the other
incentives such as promotional chips, airfare, and agent commissions. What business
can afford that kind of volume discount?
In the case of Deal 2, no business can afford deals that produce negative cash flows.
However, Deal 1 generated positive cash flows. But the profit on this deal was miniscule
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 8, Issue 2
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compared to the cash flow risk (i.e., the $2M standard deviation) and the capital
invested in assets necessary to attract these players. Management should consider cash
flows generated by or related to the assets required to produce them.
The results of the Deal 1 and Deal 2 analyses further demonstrate a lack of
knowledge regarding the mechanics of discounts. This condition may limit the ability of
management to accurately compare cash flows produced by premium players to the net
asset base (for premium play amenities). That is, if one cannot compute one's true cash
flow, one cannot compute return on net assets. Given that all the discount-granting
properties in this study pay the most attention to actual loss, it is likely that most of
those executives believe the house to have won $2M+ from the Deal 1 action. Even if
the casino reduced the $2M loss by the sum of the discount amount and play incentives,
positive cash flows would still be grossly overstated for purposes of player valuation.
When play incentives are communicated in terms of a player's actual loss, with no
regard for the number of hands/rounds played, red flags should appear in the minds of
analysts. The very couching of the offer indicates management's misunderstanding of
the process. However, even if discounts were communicated as percentage rebates oftwin, bet tracking would still be necessary. But bet tracking is unpopular, as it is a labor
intensive process. Given the evidence presented in the existing literature, many casino
executives would be disappointed by the cash flows produced by this allegedly highprofit segment, known as the high-roller business.

Discount Policy Flaws
One of the most deceiving characteristics of a discount is that a 10% rebate of a
player's actual loss almost always results in a much greater percentage decrease in twin. Previous researchers have shown that the discount reduces the house advantage of
the game, whether the player wins or loses (Lucas, Kilby &
Santos, 2002). This abstract play incentive is difficult to
understand, but much more costly than it appears. The terms of
To avoid future miscues,
the game change at the level of the expected value formula.
casino executives are
To avoid future miscues, casino executives are encouraged
encouraged to use the
to use the available resources such as discount analysis software
and the growing literature base. However, the authors realize that
available resources such as
paradigms are not easily diminished. For example, gaming
discount analysis software
executives approach the premium player market with the goal of
and the growing literature
winning the player's bankroll. It sounds innocent enough, but it
leads to a focus on actual wins and losses at the player level,
base.
ignoring the normal variance of the outcome distribution.
Players of unfair games (games with a house advantage) will
lose in the long run. However, in the short-term, some may appear to be brilliant while
others may appear cursed or even ignorant. But the truth always equals the product of
the amount wagered and the house advantage. Casino executives must ignore actual
wins/losses when valuing players. Casino executives should not concern themselves
with determining who they can beat; they should concentrate on attracting customers to
the games. If this requires play incentives, deals should be structured in such a way that
they produce an acceptable profit for the risk endured. See Kilby, Fox and Lucas (2004)
for more on how to properly structure discounts.

Limitations and Future Research
Although this work is the only study of its kind, the lack of response to the survey
leaves much to learn about the specific discounting policies of casinos. However the
responders were true to form, supporting the claims of existing researchers. Other
survey efforts might include a hypothetical scenario, detailing the results of premium
player's trip(s). Given this information, respondents would be asked to describe the
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discount, if any, this player would receive. An actual loss of $50,000 is recommended
for use in this capacity, as it is great enough to trigger a discount by most properties.
Further, many casinos have players capable of losing $50,000, preventing a low
response rate due to item design exclusion.
Through this hypothetical question format, variables such as the number of hands
played could be isolated and manipulated. These questions would demonstrate whether
the responders understand the role of each variable in the discount process. As casinos
executives are reluctant to discuss discounting practices, only repeated attempts to
gather information on this phenomenon will help researchers describe the discounting
practices. No one study is likely to contain data from 75 casinos.
Other important issues deserving more attention are bet tracking policies and
general discount theory. Specifically, questions aimed at the value of discounts to
players. For example, does a 10% discount reduce the house advantage by 10%? Bet
tracking questions might also focus on general theory. For instance, is bet tracking
necessary to determine the true cost of a discount? Responses to these types of questions
would be most telling.
Finally, some attempt should be made to measure the industry's level of awareness
regarding the effect of bet spread on a priori discount agreements. For example, what
constraints are in place to keep the players from wagering one unit on some bets and 10
units on other bets? As erratic betting increases the cost of discounts by increasing
outcome variance, casino executives must limit bet spreads. When estimating the cost of
a discount, specific language must be used regarding average bet parameters. For
example, 50 one-unit wagers and 50 ten-unit wagers do not constitute an average bet of
5.5 units, when estimating the cost of a discount. This erratic bet pattern is characterized
by a ten-unit bet spread. All else held constant, flat bettors produce outcome
distributions with less variance than erratic bettors with the same simple average bet. As
this is a somewhat abstract concept, it would be interesting to measure the degree to
which it is understood by industry executives.
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Appendix A
Discount on Loss Survey
1.

Do you offer discounts on loss to your customers as a promotional tool?
Yes_ _ __

2.

Is a standard discount as a percentage of loss offered to players?
Yes_ _ __

3.

No _ _ __

Does the discount offered vary upon the actual loss of a customer?
Yes_ _ __

7.

No _ _ __

Does the discount offered vary upon the number of hands (spins/shoes) a customer
plays?
Yes _ _ __

6.

No _ _ __

Does the discount offered vary upon the customer's average bet?
Yes_ _ __

5.

No _ _ __

Does the discount offered vary upon the customer's credit line?
Yes_ _ __

4.

No _ _ __

No _ _ __

Please attach a weight that each factor contributes to the amount of discount
offered.
Credit Line
Average Bet
#of Hands
Actual Loss
TotallOO%

8.

Do you ever change a predetermined discount based upon the actual amount lost
by the player?
Yes._ _ __

9.

Do you ever change a predetermined discount based upon the time it takes for a
player to lose (quick loss provision)?
Yes _ _ __

10.

No _ _ __

No _ _ __

Do you utilize bet tracking for customers receiving a discount?
Yes_ _ __

No _ _ __
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